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Abstract
In the last issue of this journal Mitchell. Keller, and Kedar-Cabelli presented a unifying 
framework for the explanation-based approach to machine learning. While it works well for a 
number of systems, the framework does not adequately capture certain aspects of the systems 
under development by the explanation-based learning group at Illinois. The primary inadequacies 
arise in the treatment of concept operationality. organization of knowledge into schemata, and 
learning from observation. This paper outlines six specific problems with the previously proposed 
framework and presents an alternative generalization method to perform explanation-based learn­
ing of new concepts.
1. Introduction
The explanation-based approach to learning has recently enjoyed increased attention in the 
literature (DeJong. 1983: Ellman, 1985: Minton. 1984: Mitchell. 1983: Mitchell et al. . 1985: Moo­
ney & DeJong. 1985: Porter & Kibler. 1985: Shavlilc. 1985: Silver. 1983). Its roots can be traced 
back to the MACROP learning method in STRIPS (Fikes et al. 1972). but its recent revival, exten­
sion. and refinement must be credited independently to Silver (1983). Mitchell (1983), and DeJong 
(1981). Each of these researchers concurrently developed rather large explanation-based learning 
computer systems: LEX2 (Mitchell). LP (Silver), and ESA (DeJong).
Mitchell. Keller, and Kedar-Cabelli (1986) present a lucid description of explanation-based 
generalization. Additionally,- their formalization is shown to be able to encompass significant 
aspects of several other explanation-based systems, namely Winston et al.’s (1983) system which 
learns structural definitions from functional knowledge and the authors' system (DeJong. 1981: 
Mooney & DeJong. 1985) which learns schemata for natural language processing.
Our research on explanation-based learning has followed a somewhat different direction than 
that of Mitchell et al.. Our approach is in some ways less general and in some ways more general 
than that of Mitchell et al. (1986). The domains we have chosen have little in common with the 
domains of Mitchell's early work (Mitchell. 1983). so it is hardly surprising that we have reached 
different conclusions about explanation-based learning. As a result, we believe that Mitchell,
Keller, and Kedar-Cabelli have omitted a number of important points concerning explanation-based 
learning.
We will argue that the following points should be taken into account by an explanation-based 
method.
(1) The broader term Explanation-Based Learning better describes the approach than does 
Explanation-Based Generalization. It seems both possible and desirable to apply the approach 
to concept refinement (i.e.. specialization) as well as concept generalization.
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(2) Mitchell et a l.s  specification of explanation-based generalization does not specify how the 
examples' explanation is constructed. There are two possibilities: 1) the explanation can be 
constructed by an internal theorem prover/problem solver with no outside guidance or 2) the 
explanation can be constructed by observing and interpreting problem solving behavior of 
others. The two approaches require different levels of problem solving abilities, place 
different constraints on what concepts can be learned, and require different generalization 
steps.
(3) Mitchell et al.'s EBG generalization method is too weak. It often does not generalize the new 
concept far enough from the particular training example. The result is undergeneralizations 
that reflect many unimportant details of the example problem. As we shall see. this is a par­
ticular problem in several of the domains that we have been investigating.
(4) There are problems with the notion of an Operationally Criterion as advanced by Mitchell et 
al. The criterion itself is not always operational and should be dynamically computed rather 
than given as an input. We feel that the operationality criterion is only an approximation to 
an important, but much deeper, concept relating the abilities of the system’s performance ele­
ment to the learning process.
(5) Knowledge chunking or schematizing should play a central role in the generalization process. 
By asserting a hierarchical relationship among schemata, an explanation-based learning system 
can efficiently explore some alternative explanations of an example. This reasoning about
schemata during the generalization process is not a part of the method advanced by Mitchell 
et al.
(6) Mitchell et al. have adopted a reduced version of goal regression to perform object generaliza­
tion. They argue, quite correctly, that full goal regression (Waldinger. 1977: Nilsson. 1980) 
is inappropriate for explanation-based generalization. Instead of reduced goal regression, we 
advocate a different mechanism, equivalent in many ways to their reduced goal regression.
but capable of unification retraction which allows further generalization and alteration of the 
explanation.
In our discussion we prefer the terminology of problem solving. Mitchell. Keller, and 
Kedar-Cabelli have cast their paper more in the terminology of theorem proving. These are two 
sides of the same coin. In problem solving one speaks of states of the world, the operators that 
transform one state to another, an initial state, the goal states which are in general partial charac­
terizations of states of the world, and the plans to achieve a goal from an initial state. In theorem 
proving, one speaks of the set of propositions believed, the rules of inference that transform one 
set of believed propositions to another (generally monotonically). the initial premises, a theorem to 
be proved, and the proofs constructed for a theorem. By identifying these constituents, we can 
map any theorem proving problem into a problem solving task: given a theorem the equivalent 
goal is a state in which the theorem is among the propositions believed to be true. It is derived 
from the premises (the initial state) by applying rules of inference (operators) in a particular order. 
Thus, we will cast our comments in problem solving terminology with no loss of generality.
2. A Brief Overview of Mitchell et al.’s EBG Method
Mitchell. Keller, and Kedar-Cabelli (1986) present a general technique for learning by gen­
eralizing explanations. The technique involves learning sufficient conditions for being an example 
of a particular concept by generalizing an explanation of why a particular example meets the 
definition of the concept. Explanations are represented as proof trees composed of horn-clause 
inference rules which conclude that the example is a member of the concept.
The generalization method they present (called EBG for Explanation-Based Generalization) 
must be provided with the following information:
(1) Goal concept: A definition of the concept to be learned in terms of high-level or functional 
properties which are not directly available in the representation of an example. For example, 
the following is a goal concept for a cup as given in Winston et al. (1983):
OPEN-VESSEL(x) D STABLE(x) fl LIFTABLE(x) D CUP(x)
(2 / Training Example: A representation of a specific example of the concept in terms of lower- 
level features. For example, a training example of a cup might include the following:
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COLOR(OBJ 1 .RED)
LIGHT(OBJl)
PART-OF(OBJ 1. HANDLED
(3) Domain Theory: A set of inference rules and facts sufficient for proving that a training 
example meets the high-level definition of the concept. The domain theory for the cup exam­
ple might include the following inference rule:
IS(x,LIGHT) fl PART-OF(x.y) fl ISA(y.HANDLE) D LIFTABLE(x)
(4) Operationality Criterion: A specification of how a definition of a concept must be 
represented so that the concept can be efficiently recognized. This assures that the learned 
definition of a concept is operational (Mostow. 1983) and can be readily used to recognize 
examples of the concept. The operationality condition for the cup example might be that the 
definition of an object be represented in terms of observable features of the object such as its 
weight and a specification of its physical parts.
Given this information, the first task in EBG is to construct an explanation of why the train­
ing example satisfies the goal concept by using the inference rules in the domain theory. This expla­
nation takes the form oi a proof tree composed of horn-clause inference rules which proves that the 
training example is a member of the concept. Since this explanation must have features of the ori­
ginal object description as its leaves, these leaves must satisfy the operationality condition. Next, 
this explanation is generalized to obtain a set of sufficient conditions for which this explanation 
structure holds in general. These conditions represent general operational conditions for being a 
member of the concept. The generalization process used in EBG is a specialization of goal-regression 
(Waldmger. 1977: Nilsson. 1980). By regressing the goal concept through the explanation struc­
ture. the desired general preconditions are obtained. The generalization process is not complete 
goal-regression as given by Waldinger since the structure of the original explanation is retained. 
Only a set of sufficient conditions, rather than necessary and sufficient conditions, are computed. 
Alternative ways of matching the antecedents of the rules and alternative ways of proving 
subgoals are not considered.
Mitchell et al. proceed to show how their EBG procedure can be used to generalize examples 
in different domains. Detailed explanations and generalizations are shown for three small exam­
ples. First is the SAFE-TO-STACK example in which a rule for when something can be safely 
stacked on an endtable is learned. Second is the CUP example (Winston et al.. 1983). in which a 
rule for recognizing a cup is learned. Third is a LEX2 example (Mitchell. 1983). in which a rule is 
learned for when it is useful to apply a certain integration operator. Finally, a summary of how 
EBG might be used to handle the author’s system which learns a schema for kidnapping (DeJong. 
1981. Mooney & DeJong 1985)is given in the appendix of Mitchell et al. (1986).
The final part of the paper gives a summary of future research issues for explanation-based 
generalization. These include the following:
(1) Imperfect Theory Problem: Methods are needed for building useful explanations in 
domains which have incomplete, intractable, or inconsistent theories.
(2) Combining w ith Similarity-based Learning: Techniques are needed which combine expla­
nation and similarity-based approaches to learning to achieve the benefits of both approaches.
(3) Formulating Generalization Tasks: Methods are needed for automatically generating gen­
eralization tasks by determining what needs to be learned to increase the performance of a 
system.
3. Explanation-based Learning vs. Explanation-based Generalization
Mitchell et al. specify how the explanation-based approach can be used to generalize. Concept 
refinement is within the scope of the explanation-based approach as well. Mitchell et al. (1986) 
does not rule out explanation-based concept refinement, but neither do they discuss its possibility. 
We feel the term Explanation-Based Learning, which encompasses a broader range of phenomena, is 
to be preferred to Explanation-Based Generalization to describe the research.
Although we are not aware of any current systems which perform explanation-based
refinement1, it is an important research topic which we hope to address in the future. There are 
1 A possible candidate is the OCCAM system of Pazzani i 1985) which constructs a specialization for kidnapping infants
several reasons to pursue explanation-based refinement. The most important reason for us is that 
refinement can provide a partial solution to the difficult problem of generalizing non-independent 
conjunctive sub-goals.
Winston et al.'s (1983) cup program, discussed in Mitchell et aL. (1986) represents a real 
world domain. In fact, the notion of a cup is very complex and messy. Winston’s domain model, 
like all similar AI models, necessarily only approximates the real world. It can be viewed as an 
abstraction space (Sacerdoti. 1974) of the real world. There are, therefore, examples where 
Winston’s system disagrees with our real world concept of a cup. Consider a cup with a suitcase 
handle (much resembling a small pail - see figure 1). This is clearly an acceptable kind of handle 
for Winston's system since in the original system the assertion of LIFTABLE is proved by resorting 
to previous knowledge of suitcases being liftable because of their handles. Yet this is clearly an 
overgeneralization since the pail-cup cannot easily be grasped and drunk from at the same time 
(Hofstadter. 1983). One might argue that this is not a failure in the proof of LIFTABLE but rather 
due to a poor initial functional specification of the cup concept. After all. it neglects the cup’s most
Figure 1: The PAIL-CUP
alter being given several examples in which ini ants are held tor ransom.
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important function — enabling drinking. While this is perhaps a deficiency, it alone will not 
remove the pail-cup problem. After amending the functional specification of "cup" to include 
DRINKABLE-FROM. or some such predicate, a problem remains.
There is subtle and nasty interaction between the conjunctive sub-goals of LIFTABLE and 
DRINKABLE-FROM. The fact that a certain kind of handle makes a suitcase LIFTABLE without 
compromising the rest of its functionality does not insure that it will do the same for cup. After 
all. the function of a suitcase is very different from that of a cup.
A very powerful inferencer would be able to keep track of all of the subtle implications 
among LIFTABLE, DRINKABLE-FROM. STABLE, and all other sub-goals. However, a powerful 
inferencer is not an appropriate solution to the '‘pail-cup’* example. Such an inference engine 
would be exceedingly slow. It would spend vast amounts of time proving that many trivial and 
unlikely interactions do not occur and would take eons to process an example as complex as a 
drinking cup.
Explanation-based refinement provides a solution. One can use an inference engine that works 
in some abstraction space and is therefore quite.efficient. In fact. Mitchell el al. (1986) propose con­
structing explanations using abstract theories to deal with the problem of intractable domains. 
However, abstract theories (like Winston s) will sometimes lead to over-generalization. One might 
choose, for example, to neglect conjunctive subgoal interactions. If one’s planner never encounters 
contradictory examples, the simplifying assumptions are fine. On the other hand, if a failure is 
encountered when trying to use an incorrect concept, like the pail-cup. the system can inspect its 
previous proof to determine the source of the problem. In the case of the pail-cup. it will find that 
drinking is not possible because a hand is in the way. Furthermore, a hand is in the way because 
the location of the handle demands that location to satisfy LIFTABLE. Thus, the failure of an 
expected positive example can be used to guide the system through the original explanation proof, 
focusing attention at just those parts responsible for the offending interaction in the observed
failure.
Thus, the explanation-based approach can be used to specialize over-generalized concepts. The 
example discussed illustrates how explanation-based specialization can aid in processing interacting 
sub-goals. However, we believe explanation-based specialization will be useful in other areas as 
well. Since both specialization and generalization are subsumed, the broader term "Explanation- 
Based Learning" is more correctly used to describe the approach.
4. Explanation-Based Learning from  Observation
Learning from observation is a very important type of learning (Carbonell. Michalski & 
Mitchell. 1983) It involves learning through monitoring of the world. A human "tutor" who 
presents and classifies examples for the system is not needed. Rather, the system is simply permit­
ted to watch the behavior of others. It is the system’s responsibility to decide which examples, and 
which features of those examples, are important.
Learning from observation is particularly promising for acquiring knowledge from human 
experts for knowledge-based systems. The expert is then unencumbered by the system which 
unobtrusively observes. The human needs no knowledge of the internal workings of the system, 
and the human expert is never asked to articulate the information or methods he uses - a step 
which has proven to be a bottleneck in current knowledge-based system development. Conse­
quently. there has been an increasing amount of work in machine learning on learning apprentice 
systems (Minton. 1985: Mitchell et al.. 1985: O’Rorke 1984: Wilkins et al.. 1985) which learn by 
observing expert problem solvers and generalizing the methods they use.
The generalization algorithm given in Mitchell et al. (1986) does not specify how the explana­
tion is constructed. \e t  to derive maximum benefit from the resulting generalization, the generali­
zation algorithm should be sensitive to the explanation's derivation. As we shall see in section 9. 
the generalization algorithm is somewhat different for learning from observation than for learning 
from internal planning. The distinction consists in whether or not the explanation is known to be. 
in some sense, the best that can be supported by the domain theory. A system that learns by 
internal planning can be assured of generating an explanation that supports an optimal solution if,
for example, it uses an admissible problem solving algorithm. If. on the other hand, the explana­
tion is constructed by filling in the details of observed problem solving behavior of another, there is 
no guarantee that the resulting solution or its explanation are in any sense optimal. .
To make this point more concrete consider a fanciful example. Suppose we know a fair 
amount about physics and electricity. Our domain theory consists of ohms law. conservation of 
energy, and many other such concepts. It may have occurred to us that knowing how to convert 
electrical energy into light energy would be a useful thing. Thus, we have a general goal of know­
ing how to convert electricity to light and a domain model from which one can derive a number of
explanations of how to achieve that goal. The system’s task is to find and generalize one such 
explanation.
The first type of explanation-based learning system, which learns from internal planning, 
requires a very powerful inferencer indeed. It is required to perform a massive search a task simi­
lar to the process of Edison’s original invention of the lightbulb. The system might "invent" the 
neon or fluorescent light rather than the incandescent variety. An important point to note is that 
the efficiency of the solution (and the level of generality that the explanation will support) is deter­
mined entirely by the generality of the domain theory and properties of the planner. The LEX2 
system (Mitchell. 1983) is of this variety. It requires no externally supplied suggestions as to how 
an integration problem is to be solved.
The second type of system forms explanations with the aid of external hints. In our electric 
light example we might give the hint "try tungsten." Another form of hint would be to specify all 
of the properties of a particular light bulb: that its filament is tungsten, that its bulb is glass and 
that oxygen is evacuated from the bulb. etc. Incidentally, some of the example systems in Mitchell 
et al. (1986) (e.g., the SAFE-TO-STACK example) are of this type. However, they do not discuss 
the ramifications of this position either for the explanation construction process or the generaliza­
tion process. A third type of hint might be the observed acctions of an expert problem solver. To 
construct an explanation from an action sequence the system must justify that all preconditions are 
true (perhaps by tracing them to effects of previous actions). The system may also have to infer
unobservable or unobserved actions and states. An example of this second type of explanation- 
based learning system is our natural language system (Mooney & DeJong. 1985). In an appendix. 
Mitchell et al. (1986) outline how this system can be cast into their framework. While the exercise 
clearly shows a deep grasp of our system, it is an unnatural fit. The goal concept„ for example, is 
much more complex than the goal concept in the other systems mentioned. We believe the awkward 
fit is due to the lack of an observation input to their generalization method that can be used as an 
explanation hint.
Such hints can greatly reduce the amount of searching performed by the planner. Understand­
ing complex problem-solving actions of someone else is a far easier task than producing those 
actions (DeJong, 1986). A system that learns from observation can possess a simpler planner and 
still acquire more difficult concepts than a system that must construct its own explanation from 
scratch.
Hints not only simplify the explanation process: they also bias the system toward certain 
explanations and away from others. For example, with the hint “try tungsten" the invention of the 
incandescent light, while still difficult, becomes much much easier. However, invention of the neon 
light becomes less likely. In the case of observing problem solving actions of an expert, the system 
is strongly biased towards an explanation of the particular solution used by the expert. The 
expert's solution may have obvious inefficiencies that will be reflected in the solution s explanation.
Note that in this case the efficiency of the solution (and also the level of generality that the 
explanation will support) is determined in part by the system's properties and in part by the hints 
it is given. It is important that the system’s generalization process factor out inefficiencies wher­
ever possible. For example, we may observe an expert fashion the glass bulb for the incandescent 
light m a wasteful manner. If our domain theory includes a glass-blowing schema that specifies a 
better way to construct the bulb, the generalization process should substitute the efficient general 
schema for the inefficient observed action sequence. This step need not be performed when general- 
izing from an explanation constructed by a system of the first type: by constructing our planner 
and domain theory appropriately we can insure that the resulting explanations will have the
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desired properties.
There are two conclusions to be drawn from this section. First, the explanation-based gen­
eralization method should haye an optional argument to allow for learning by untutored observa­
tion. This argument is a sequence of observed states and actions performed by an observed expert. 
The sequence need not be complete. It is treated as a hint at an underlying explanation for how to 
achieve the goal. Second, the generalization method should be somewhat different depending on 
whether the explanation was constructed from internal planning or observation.
5. Improving Generalization
The generalization algorithm of Mitchell et al. seems to us to be very conservative. It is seems 
to be primarily concerned with generalizing constants that appear explicitly in the training example 
mto appropriately constrained variables. It appears from their description that predicates and con­
stants which are introduced by inference rules are not subject to generalization. This view is born 
out by the examples in the paper.
The mechanism used is goal regression. However, full goal regression is an unwieldy process 
and is not performed. Instead. EBG uses a modified version of goal regression which ignores dis- 
juncts. If there are several alternative variable identifications that allow a proof to be true, only 
the unification used in the explanation of the training example is considered. Also, if there are 
several possible ways to complete a subproof (which would result in regression through disjunctive 
subgoals) only the subproof actually used in the training example's explanation is used.
The result of these design decisions is that the resulting concept description is not as general as 
it might be. Indeed, specific and unimportant details of the example observation can be reflected in 
the generalized concept.
As we shall see in section 8 many of these problems can be overcome through integrating the 
performance element into the generalization algorithm. It is instructive to discuss two important 
types of generalization that goal regression alone cannot perform.
5.1. Generalizing Predicates -
The first problem we will discuss is that of generalizing predicates. This problem does not 
arise easily in the SAFE-TO-STACK example or other similar domains. However, it arises 
immediately in moderately complex problem-solving domains. Consider our natural language sys­
tem (Mooney & DeJong. 1985) which is given the following kidnapping example and must learn a 
general kidnapping concept:
Fred is the father of Mary and is a millionaire. John approached Mary. She was wearing blue je­
ans. John pointed a gun at her and told her he wanted her to get into his car. He droved her to his 
hotel and locked her in his room. John called Fred and told him John was holding Mary captive 
John told Fred if Fred gave him $250,000 at Trenos then John would release Mary. Fred gave him 
the money and John released Mary.
The story includes a description of the kidnapper telephoning the victims father. The telephone 
event might be represented as:
TELEPHONE(human079. human077. cond003)
where human079 is John, the kidnapper. human077 is Fred, the millionaire, and cond003 
represents the bargain conditions that John proposes. An inference rule of the domain theory might 
be:
TELEPHONE(x.y,z) =*> KNOWS(y,z)
That is. successfully telephoning someone results in a particular mental state of the listener. The 
knowledge state is crucial to the success of the kidnapping. Thus, the TELEPHONE action and 
resulting knowledge state are components of the explanation. The millionaire must believe that 
giving money will free the victim. Otherwise, the action of John giving Fred the money is unmo­
tivated.
EBG s goal regression method allows no possibility of altering the predicates that compose the 
explanation. Lsing this generalization method on the example results in a kidnapping concept 
which requires the use of a telephone to inform the millionaire. This is clearly an extreme under­
generalization. i here is nothing central about telephoning. The important part of the explanation 
is the knowledge state that the kidnapper achieves in the millionaire. Telephoning is just one of
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many ways lo achieve that state. He might as well have sent a ransom note, or a telegram, or a 
carrier pigeon. Indeed, any communication mechanism that achieves the required knowledge state 
would work. The concept of kidnapping ought to reflect this generalization. The TELEPHONE 
action predicate of the observed example ought to be replaced by a more general COMMUNICATE 
action predicate in the general concept of kidnapping. The COMMUNICATE action can then be 
instantiated at problem-solving time in one of many possible ways depending on the state of the 
world at the time the problem-solver invokes KIDNAPPING. If a phone is handy, it can be used: 
otherwise another method can be selected.
There are other eccentricities pf the example that the generalization algorithm of Mitchell et 
al. would preserve: only daughters of millionaires can be kidnapped, the ransom payment must 
take place at a restaurant, etc. These inappropriate dependencies on the details of the observed 
example must be eliminated by the generalization process if the system is to have any chance of 
applying its new knowledge productively. These details are not entirely irrelevant: their effects are 
crucial to the success of the observed concept. However, requiring the precise details that were 
observed seems to narrow the concept unnecessarily.
5.2. Structural Generalization
A related but separate issue involves the structure of the example explanation. The EBG 
method does not permit generalization of the example explanation's structure. Consider the 
"SAFE-TO-STACK" concept. In the observed example SAFE-TO-STACK is true because the first 
object is proved to weigh less through a calculation based on its volume and density. This is fine 
for this specific example. The problem is that the resulting general concept "SAFE-TO-STACK" 
then requires the first object's weight to be calculated by a volume times density computation. 
Suppose our world knowledge specifies that the default weight of an ashtray is 1 (in the same units 
as the default weight of an endtable). and that OBJ17 is an ashtray whose density is unknown. 
The SAFE-TO-STACK concept acquired by the EBG method cannot itself conclude that the ashtray 
can safely be stacked on the endtable.
The complete explanation must be present. No alternative achievement of subgoals is 
allowed, no matter how easy it may be to constructs such alternatives. This inability to alter the 
example s explanation structure results in another kind of undergeneralization. While related to 
the previous undergeneralization problem it cannot be alleviated by a one-for-one substitution of a 
more general schema for a more specific one.
To illustrate the inefficiency, consider a robot manipulator system (Segre & DeJong, 1985) 
that learns assembly concepts (i.e.. how to assemble parts from an explanation-based generalization 
of an observed example).
First, it is necessary to develop some background on our manipulator model. There are two 
low-level manipulator actions to change the position of a grasped piece: TRANSLATE and 
MOVETO. TRANSLATE moves the grasped piece along a straight line while maintaining the 
piece s orientation. It is an expensive and slow operation since the kinematic equations must be 
solved at many points with interpolations in between to insure the proper orientation and straight 
line trajectory. MOVETO changes the current position and orientation of the grasped piece to some 
desired position and orientation. MOVETO is faster and more efficient. It solves the kinematic 
equations only once for the desired state and then sets all of the manipulator joints accordingly. It 
is cheaper to use that TRANSLATE because it does not enforce any specific intermediate values on 
the position or orientation of the grasped piece.
Now we can examine how inefficiencies can arise in a task assembly concept acquired by an 
explanation-based method similar to that of Mitchell et al. (1986). Suppose our learning manipula­
tor is shown how to build a miniature bench by placing piece A in just the right spot on the top of 
piece B so that the pegs in A are inserted into the holes in B (see figure 2). Further, suppose that 
the assembly sequence demonstrated to the system consists of grasping piece A. followed by a 
TRANSLATE to lift piece A straight up off of the table, a TRANSLATE to position piece A 
directly above piece B. a ROTATE to orient piece A to correctly match piece B. and finally a 
TRANSLATE down to place piece A on piece B (see figure 3A).
Figure 2z The M iniature Bench
The explanation of how the bench is realized by the observed action sequence includes, of 
course, the TRANSLATE and ROTATE actions. The explanation specifies that the last TRANSLATE 
combines the pieces while maintaining their proper relative orientations: the ROTATE establishes 
the proper orientation of piece A with respect to piece B: etc. Consider using the EBG procedure to 
generalize this explanation. Since all of the actions participate in the explanation or proof that a 
correct bench is constructed, they all appear in the new BUIL.D-A-BENCH task concept generated 
by the EBG procedure. Generalization has occurred so that the piece identity with A and B has been 
eliminated. However, since the EBG process cannot alter the structure of the explanation, the gen­
eralized concept achieves the bench using three TRANSLATES and a ROTATE, even though a more 
efficient MOVETO could be used instead of the first two TRANSLATES and the ROTATE. The 
MOVETO equally well positions piece A above piece B with the proper orientation (see figure 3B). 
An inefficient task concept is learned because the observed task sequence is inefficient. While it is 
unrealistic always to expect an optimal task concept from observing a horribly inefficient example, 
we will see in section 8.1 that some optimizing is easily done. In particular, in this case the 
system s domain theory must already contain the knowledge necessary to replace the
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Figure 3A
Inefficient Sequence
Figure 3B 
Efficient Sequence
TRANSLATES and ROTATE with a MOVETO. This knowledge has to do with the effects of these 
actions and must already be present to perform the goal regression. Yet the knowledge cannot be 
used by the EBG procedure to fabricate a more efficient assembly concept.
6. Problems with the Operationality Criterion
How can we assure that a new concept is meaningful to the problem solver? The final opera­
tional definition of a concept must be specified in a vocabulary which the problem solver under­
stands. After all. if recognizing or applying a new concept involves solving sub-problems which are 
beyond the capabilities of the problem solver, then that concept will not improve the efficiency or 
abilities of the problem solver.
Mitchell et al. (.1986) recognize this as an important problem. Their solution is to restrict the 
allowable target vocabulary through the Operationality Criterion. This specifies that "The concept 
definition must be expressed in terms of the predicates used to describe examples... or other 
selected, easily evaluated predicates from the domain theorv_"
There are two problems with this definition of the operationally criterion. First, the process 
of specifying the operationally criterion for a particular domain is not itself operational. It is clear 
that Mitchell et al. (1986) have in mind including some predicates and not others and that the 
problem solver should have more or less immediate access to the truth values of the predicates 
which are included. However, there is no mention of how these predicates are actually selected or 
how easy their evaluation must be to meet the operationality criterion.
Second, the specification of predicates alone will not insure ease of evaluation. The difficulty 
of discovering a truth value is properly associated with a proposition as a whole, not just the predi­
cate. Consider, for example, the following two propositions:
(PROVABLE "2+2=4")
(PROVABLE "FERMAT’S LAST THEOREM")
They both use the same predicate but the truth value of the first is far easier to determine than the 
truth value of the second. The first is operational, the second is not. Many predicates behave in this 
fashion; their operationality depends on their arguments. A training example might be selected in 
which the propositions are easily evaluated but the very same predicates may be difficult to evalu­
ate when applied to later examples. Nor can we limit the operationality criterion to predicates that 
are known to be operational for all arguments. Such a restriction would overly impoverish the 
vocabulary. Predicates like VOLUME and DENSITY necessary for the SAFE-TO-STACK example 
could not be used. Determining the the volume of an irregularly shaped solid can be quite involved. 
It is easily evaluated only for simple objects or objects whose volume is included as innate in the 
domain theory or explicitly specified in the training example.
7. A Technical Problem with the EBG Algorithm
In addition to the conceptual difficulties we have raised, there is a technical problem with the 
generalization algorithm as described in Mitchell et al. (1986). The problem is that they fail to 
mention the necessity of an additional step when generalizing an explanation. The following simple 
example illustrates the problem. The rules in domain theory for this example are:
HATE(a,b) 0 POSSESS«a,c) D WEAPON« c) D KILL« a,b)
DEPRESSED« w) D HATE(w,w)
BUY(u,v) D POSSESS«u,v)
GUN(z) Z) WEAPON«z)
Given the following information (i.e. training example):
DEPRESSED« JOHN)
BUY« JOHN, OBJ1 )
GUN« OBJ 1 )
it is easy to conclude that John will commit suicide as shown in Figure 4. The result of performing 
EBG generalization on this proof is shown in Figure 5 in the manner used in Mitchell et al. (1986). 
Each conjunct in the current regressed expression (the underlined elements at each level) is unified 
with the consequent of the appropriate rule to yield a set of substitutions. This set of substitutions 
is then applied to the antecedent of the rule to produce the new regressed expression. The substitu­
tion is also applied to the remaining conjuncts before regressing them through their appropriate 
rules. The result is the following set of generalized conditions:
DEPRESSED«y ) D BUY(y,c) fl GUN(c)
However, the goal concept specified in the explanation structure is KILL(x,y) when in fact the 
explanation is only valid for the specialized concept of suicide: KILL(y,y). The problem is that
KILL( JOHN,JOHN) 
a
HATE (JOHN, JOHN) P0SSESS(J0HN,0BJ1) WEAPON(OBJ1
t t t
DEPRESSED(JOHN) BUY(JOHN,OBJ1) GUN(OBJ1)
Figure 4: Explanation of the Suicide Example
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GOAL CONCEPT: KILL(x,y)
R1:
HATE(x,y)
R2: HATE(w,w)
n
POSSESS(x.c)
POSSESS(y,c) 
R3: POSSESS(u,v)
{ x/w, y/x} t Iva..
{  x/a, y/b}
WEAPON(c)
DEPRESSED(w)
DEPRESSED(y)
WEAPON(c) 
R4: WEAPON(z)
c/v} | {c / z }
BUY(u,v) GUN(2)
BUY(y,c) GUN(c)
Figure 5: Generalizing the Suicide Example Using EBG 
(Underlined expressions are the results of regressing the goal concept.)
regression only results in a set of generalized antecedents, or sufficient conditions for being an 
example of the concept. It does not result in a specification of the proper goal concept. As in the 
SLICIDE example, the explanation itself may impose certain constraints on the goal concept. 
Although the problem of determining the appropriate generalized goal concept is not discussed at 
all in Mitchell et al. (1986). it is discussed in Mahadevan (1985). and Mitchell et al. (1985). In 
these papers, it is described how one can determine the generalized goal concept by rederiving a gen­
eralized proof, using the regressed antecedents as a training example and applying the same rules as 
in the original example. The regenerated proof for the suicide example is shown in figure 6. The 
complete generalization algorithm using goal regression is actually a two step process:
(1) Regress the original specification of the goal concept through the explanation to obtain a set of
generalized antecedents.
KILL(y,y)
DEPRESSED(y) BUY(y,c) . GUN(c)
Figure 6: The Generalized Proof fo r  the Suicide Example
(2) Starting with these generalized antecedents, rederive the proof to obtain the generalized goal 
concept (consequent).
In a later section we will present an alternative generalization algorithm which does not 
employ goal regression and avoids having to make two passes through the explanation.
8. Some Solutions
The solution to some of these dilemmas involves acknowledging that the explanation-based 
learning system has two logically distinct components: an acquisition element and a performance 
element. The purpose of learning is to improve the processing ability of the performance element. 
The acquisition element includes two phases. First, it constructs an explanation for the training 
example and then it generalizes the explanation to form a new concept. The performance element 
makes use of the new generalized concept. In learning from observation, the explanation phase of 
the acquisition element produces an explanation from the observed operator sequence. In learning 
from one s own plans, the explanation phase of the acquisition element uses the performance ele­
ment. Either way. the generalization phase of the acquisition element should be sensitive to the 
abilities of the performance element. The notion of operationality must be judged with respect to
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the abilities of a particular performance element. This is not the case in Mitchell et al. (1986). 
While both the understander and the performance element operate on the same knowledge base, 
they reflect the world knowledge in subtly different ways.
The understander’s task is to construct a causal model of the observed example. The explana­
tion of how the example satisfies the goal in question is a subset of the causal model. The perfor­
mance element benefits from the generalized explanation. As more concepts are acquired, the per­
formance element is able to process much more efficiently and, due to resource limitations, is able 
to correctly process observations that were previously beyond its capabilities. The performance 
element can be viewed as a problem solver in the broad sense of the term. It achieves goals by 
finding appropriate action sequences (as in the robot manipulator system) or recognizes instances of 
concepts (as m the SAFE-TO-STACK example). In either case, the performance element has a task 
with a well defined goal and performance on this task is to be improved through explanation-based 
learning. We will find it useful to refer'to the performance element as a problem solver and to use 
the vocabulary of problem solving to describe its operations.
Since the functioning of the problem solver (or performance element) is important only after 
the concept has been learned. Mitchell et al. leave it out of their specification of the Explanation- 
Pased Learning process. However, we believe the abilities of the problem solver should have a 
major impact on the generalization process and therefore on the concept to be learned.
8.1. Generalizing with Schemata
In an explanation-based system which learns schemata, the schema knowledge itself can be 
used to generalize the example. This type of generalization is not a part of the explanation-based 
generalization method outlined in Mitchell er al. (1986). but as we shall see. it can be employed to 
overcome some of the undergeneralization problems discussed in the previous section. This form of 
generalization is possible because the schemata are themselves generalized knowledge chunks.
The central idea underlying a schema-based problem solving system is that the system’s 
knowledge should be structured in such a way that knowledge relevant to achieving a certain goal
is grouped together (Chafe. 1975; Chamiak. 1976; Minsky. 1975; Schank & Abelson. 1977).
This structuring of the system s knowledge into schemata aids in understanding observed 
inputs and also results in an important, and efficient kind of generalization. For example, in the 
kidnapping story given earlier. John (the kidnapper) points a gun at Mary (the victim) to force her 
into his car so he can drive her to his hotel where he detains her. This is an important action for 
John; if he did not have the gun Mary would probably not have gotten into the car and his attempt 
at kidnapping would have failed. However, this action is not essential in all kidnappings. There 
are many ways John might have forced Mary into his car. He might have threatened her with a 
knife or some other weapon, he might have overpowered her. or he might have drugged her. Furth­
ermore. he might not have used his car at all; he might have simply tricked her into entering his 
hotel room to capture her. etc.. Clearly, a general kidnapping schema ought not to require a gun. 
The gun-pointing event should be generalized in the final schema.
Is there an appropriate generalization of the gun-pointing event? Can it be generalized 
efficiently without tediously replanning with all possible variations? The answer to both questions 
is yes , and the trick is to rely on the schematic structure of the example's explanation.
In a schema understander, the explanation is constructed by finding how the observed inputs 
fit into known schemata and determining how these schemata can fit together into a well-formed 
whole. The pointing of the gun must be understood as a component of the known schema 
THREATEN. Furthermore, it must be understood that John is THREATENing Mary so that she 
will get into his car. and he wants her in his car so he can drive her to his hotel room to lock her 
up. Thus, pointing a gun is John’s sub-sub-sub-sub-goal of detaining Mary. In our system, the 
schema for seizing and detaining someone is called CAPTURE. In constructing the explanation for 
this story the system realizes that a CAPTURE of Mary must be performed to allow a plausible 
BARGAIN between John and Fred in which John trades Mary’s freedom for $250,000. Thus, the 
system understands that John uses the known schema CAPTURE in a novel way to satisfy a 
precondition for the known schema BARGAIN.
The schemata CAPTURE and BARGAIN are already known and. therefore, already general­
ized. This already-existing generality can be exploited in the new schema for kidnapping. The solu­
tion is to eliminate those portions of the explanation which are merely nominal instantiations of 
known schemata. In the kidnapping explanation the system is left with CAPTURE and BARGAIN. 
The goal regression step, or its equivalent, is then performed on this greatly reduced explanation.
What happened to the event of John pointing his gun at Mary? It was eliminated as a nomi­
nal (and. therefore, easily replannable) sub-goal deep inside the explanation of the CAPTURE 
schema. However, any other successful instantiation of CAPTURE would have worked as well, 
provided it satisfies the inter-schema requirements imposed by the goal regression phase (i.e.. that 
there must be a rich person who values the freedom of the person selected to be captured, etc.)
8.2. A Better Operationality Criterion
Of course, the CAPTURE schema itself need not contain a complete specification of all possible 
ways to CAPTURE a person. Rather it need only provide CAPTURE specific information which 
can then be easily fleshed out in a number of ways by the performance element through interac­
tions with the system's other schemata (Chafe. 1976: Schank. 1982).
Any goal for which the system possesses a schema can be operationalized with very little 
effort. Thus, the operationality criterion is exactly that set of goals for which the system possesses 
schemata. In other words, the operationality criterion is that set of goals that the system could 
easily achieve using normal means by simply instantiating an existing schema. There are two 
important implications of this position: 1) The operationality criterion is -derivable from the 
system s performance element and. therefore, should not be independently input to the system: 2) 
the operationality criterion is dynamic, not static: as the system learns new schemata, additional
goals become operational since the system can use the new schemata as building blocks to construct 
future explanations.
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83 . An A lternative to Goal Regression
As described earlier, Mitchell et. al. s EBG method employs a version of goal regression to gen­
eralize explanations. As we explained in section 7. the generalization process described in Mitchell 
et al. (1986) has a technical problem which can be corrected by augmenting the process. In this sec­
tion. we present an alternative technique for generalizing explanations which we believe has certain 
advantages.
We developed our method independently of Mitchell et al. and it does not employ goal 
regression. The technique involves maintaining a version of the proof tree with uninstantiated ver­
sions of the general rules (an explanation structure (Mitchell et al.. 1986)) and two independent 
substitution lists called SPECIFIC and GENERAL. Applying the SPECIFIC substitution to the expla­
nation structure results in an explanation for the specific example, while applying the GENERAL 
substitution results in a generalized explanation.
The explanation structure and the two substitution lists are maintained during the construc­
tion of the original explanation independently of how the explanation is built. When a rule is 
invoked during the explanation phase, whether by a planner or by an understander, a copy of the 
uninstantiated rule is added to the explanation structure. A unification between a specific state­
ment or goal of the particular example and a general domain rule is made in the context of the 
SPECIFIC substitution and any new substitutions required for the unification are added to the 
SPECIFIC list. A unification between two domain rules in the explanation structure is done twice, 
once using the SPECIFIC substitution list and once using the GENERAL one. in both cases adding any 
newly created substitutions. This process assures that the GENERAL list contains only and all those 
substitutions which are required to maintain the validity of the explanation structure.
Letting cr stand for the SPECIFIC substitution and y for the GENERAL substitution, the gen­
eralization procedure may be formally specified as follows (using the notation defined in Nilsson 
( 1980)):
fo r  each equality between expressions e, and e2 in the explanation structure:
i f  e, is the antecedent of a domain rule and e2 is the consequent of a domain rule 
then let <j> -  the most general unifier of e,cr and e7cr 
let <J = cr(f> (* update SPECIFIC substitution) 
let 8 *  the most general unifier of e,y and e2y 
let y -  yS (* update GENERAL substitution) 
else let <f> = the most general unifier of e,(J and e2cr 
let o' = (T<f> (* update SPECIFIC substitution)
We have constructed a prototype generalizer which uses this procedure to generalize explana­
tions in various domains (Mooney & Bennett. 1986) This system has been used to generalize exam­
ples presented in the literature on STRIPS robot planning (Fikes et al.. 1972). generating physical 
descriptions of objects from functional information (Winston et al.. 1983). solving integration 
problems (Mitchell. 1983). designing logic circuits (Mitchell et al.. 1985). and proving theorems in 
mathematical logic (O Rorke. 1984). Figure 7 shows our generalization process applied to the sui­
cide example. The final substitutions shown in the figure are obtained by performing the 
unifications for rules R1 through R4 in order, although any order results in equivalent substitu­
tions up to a change of variable names. Table 1 shows a trace of the unifications and how they 
affect the two substitutions. Applying the SPECIFIC substitution list to the explanation structure 
generates the specific explanation as shown in Figure 4. Applying the GENERAL substitution list to 
the explanation structure generates the generalized explanation (the same as figure 6 but with y 
renamed to w and c renamed to z). The general rule represented by this generalized proof is:
DEPRESSED! v )  (1 BUY(w,z) fl GUN(z) D KILL(w.v)
i he technique outlined above is functionally equivalent to the corrected goal-regression tech­
nique described in section 7. In other words, the generalized antecedents generated from a given 
explanation are the same for both algorithms. However, we believe there are several advantages of 
this technique over the goal-regression approach. First, the generalization process is integrated with 
the process for building explanations, instead of requiring an independent process which must trace 
down the explanation after it is constructed. Every time a rule is added to the explanation, the 
SPECIFIC and GENERAL substitutions are updated. Generalization is accomplished by simply 
applying a substitution to the explanation structure. Second, it results in a full generalized
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GOAL: KILL(JOHN,JOHN)
II
R1: KILL(a.b)
R2: HATE(a,b)
III
HATE(w,w)
t
DEPRESSED(w)
II
DEPRESSED(JOHN)
R3: POSSESS(a,c) 
III
POSSESS(u,v)
t
BUY(u,v)
II
BUY(JOHN,OBJ1)
R4: WEAPONS(c)
III
WEAPONS(z)
t
GUN(z)
II
GUN(OBJ1)
II: Unifications added only to SPECIFIC 
III: Unifications added to both SPECIFIC and GENERAL 
Final Substitutions: GENERAL: { w/a, w/b, u/w, v/c, z/v} 
SPECIFIC: {jOHN/a, JOHN/b, JOHN/w, JOHN/u, v/cf OBJ1/v, 0BJ1/z}
Figure 7: Explanation Structure and Substitutions for the Suicide Example
Table 1: Unifications fo r the Suicide Example.
UNIFICATION s P E c in c GENERAL
Rl:
KILL( JOHN. JOHN )=KILL( a.b) JOHN/a, JOHN/b
R2:
HATE( a.b )=HATE( w, w) 
DEPRESSED! w ^ DEPRESSED! JOHN)
JOHN/u* w/a, w/b
R3:
POSSESS! a,c )=POSSESS! u.v) 
BUY! u.v )=BUY( JOHN.OBJ 1)
JOHN/u, v/c 
OBJl/v
u/w, v/c
R4:
WEAPON! c )* WEAPON! z) 
GUN(z)=GUN(OBJl)
OBJl/z z/v
explanation. Goal regression, on the other hand, only results in generalized antecedents. In order
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to obtain the full generalized explanation using goal regression, one must construct it by reapplying 
the rules in the explanation structure to the generalized antecedents (as in Mahadevan (1985)). It 
is not clear whether or not our method is actually more efficient than EBG in terms of computa­
tional complexity: however, we feel these two differences at least make our approach more elegant.
An additional facility of our generalization method is the ability to retract unifications from 
the GENERAL substitution. This is important in that it allows for “ pruning" of the explanation if 
the “ operationality criterion" is met by higher nodes in the proof tree and not just the leaves. For 
example, if we knew that we could easily determine whether or not a given item was a WEAPON, 
we could further generalize the suicide example by not requiring that the weapon be a GUN. This is 
done by removing the inheritance rule: GUN(z) D WEAPON!z) from the generalized explanation and 
retracting its unifications from the GENERAL substitution. This results in retracting the substitu­
tion. z/v from the GENERAL substitution shown in Figure 7. The new generalized rule for this 
example .then becomes:
DEPRESSED!w) f! BUY(w.v) fl WEAPON!v) D KILL(w.w)
When an explanation is constructed by observing external behavior, it is important to be able to 
prune the explanation since the system may already have operational concepts which are more 
general than those used in the particular training example.
9. Our Version o f Explanation-Based Generalization
We now advance a modification of the explanation-based generalization problem and method 
given in Mitchell et al. (1986). We will assume that the performance element is a schema-based 
problem solving system. Within this context, our method attempts to overcome some of the prob­
lems outlined earlier in the paper. In particular, it includes the possibility of learning from obser­
vation. it allows for generalizing predicates, and it allows for altering the structure of the explana­
tion. It also eliminates the operationality criterion as an explicit input.
First, we will require some additional terminology. The world is composed of objects. each of 
which may have properties and relations to other objects. A specification of all of the objects and
their current properties and relations is a world state. A goal is a specification of a desired partial 
world state. Operators map one world state into another by altering the properties or relations of 
objects in the world. An operator is defined by specifying its effects and the conditions which must 
hold in the world for its application. It is assumed that operators must be applied serially, not in 
parallel. A schema is a partially ordered set of operators and/or simpler schemata linked causally. 
For the most part, schemata will be used as problem solving concepts. That is. useful schemata 
will be those that organize operators to achieve an important goal, or set of goals, in a general way. 
A problem is specified by an initial state and a goal. The solution to a problem is a sequence of 
operators which transform the initial world state into some state which matches the goal. An 
explanation of a solution is the operator sequence that solves a problem, together with an annota­
tion which captures how effects of one operator match the preconditions of another. Often this 
annotation takes the form of matching the expansion of a known schema to operators or lower- 
level schemata. When no known higher-level schema can incorporate a lower-level 
operator/schema sequence, the annotation is simply a specification of the most general unifications 
necessary for the effects of antecedent actions to match the preconditions of later ones. The expla­
nation forms a proof that the solution sequence does, in fact, achieve the goal.
Table 2 presents a summary of the generalization problem we are interested in. The task 
faced by the system is to augment its domain theory with a new schema which specifies a general 
method for achieving the goal. This is done by finding a particular solution to the given problem 
and then generalizing the solution into a schema using the system's existing domain theory. The 
particular solution may either be input to the system or generated by the learning system's perfor­
mance element. If the solution is produced internally then the observed operator secpuence is not 
given.
9.1. The Explanation-Based Generalization Method
Table 3 is an outline of our explanation-based generalization method. Steps 1 and 2 form the 
explanation phase. If an expert is observed solving the problem, the method builds an interpreta­
tion ol the input operators. It justifies how the goal is realized and how the preconditions of each
Table 2: THE EXPLANATION-BASED GENERALIZATION PROBLEM
Given:
•  Domain Theory. The domain theory consists of three parts. First, a specification of types of 
objects in the world and their properties. Second, a set of inference rules for inferring proper­
ties and relations from other properties and relations. Third, a library of problem solving 
operators and already known general schemata. These schemata can be previously learned or 
hand-coded.
•  Goal. A general specification of a goal state. In general, a goal is an incomplete world state and 
can be specified in non-operational terms (e.g., in a functional vocabulary).
•  Initial World State: A specification of the objects in the world and their properties.
•  Observed Operator /State Sequence (optional): An observed sequence of low-level operators, 
performed by an expert, which achieves an instance of the goal. In some situations, some 
operators may be missing, in which case they must be inferred from achieved states given in 
the input.
Determine:
•  A new schema that achieves the goal in a general way.
Table 3: THE GENERALIZATION METHOD
(1) If there is no observed operator input, use the domain theory to construct a plan which 
achieves the goal. Otherwise, use the domain theory to build a causally complete interpreta­
tion of the observed operator input. In either case, maintain GENERAL and SPECIFIC substitu­
tions as described in section 8.3.
(2) Eliminate operators and states which do not causally support the goal. The remaining struc­
ture is the solution explanation.
(3) Identify nominal instantiations of known schemata and eliminate them by retracting the 
unifications between the general specification of the schema and the specific operators used in 
the instantiation.
(4) Remove actions and states which only support inferences to more abstract actions or states. 
This is done by removing these abstraction inferences along with their antecedents and re­
tracting the unifications binding them to the rest of the explanation.
(5) If the explanation was constructed from an observed solution, look for subgoals which can be 
achieved in a more efficient manner. For each subgoal in the explanation, check if the system 
already has a schema for achieving that subgoal which is more efficient than the one used by 
the observed agent. If so. retract the observed plan for achieving this subgoal and insert the 
more efficient schema.
(6) Generate the final generalized explanation by applying the resulting GENERAL substitution to 
the remaining explanation structure.
operator are achieved. If there is no observed operator input, the system constructs its own plan to 
achieve the goal. Step 2 eliminates observed operators and initial states which are irrelevant to the 
realization of the goal. For example, if an apprentice system observes an expert air traffic controller 
buy a cup of coffee from a nearby vending machine, it disregards that action as not supporting the 
goal of avoiding mid-air collisions. If a block’s world planning system constructs a plan for build­
ing an arch, it eliminates facts about the color of the blocks since these facts are never used as 
preconditions of an action in the plan.
Step 3 insures that no redundant work is done in generalizing an example. It eliminates nomi­
nal instantiations of already known schemata. A nominal schema instantiation is one in which the 
instantiation gives no significant information about what happened beyond that already specified in 
the general schema. For example, consider John as an expert problem-solver who. in the course of 
his problem solving, must eat lunch. Suppose we. as a learning apprentice, observe him entering 
McDonalds on Green Street. He walks up to the counter, asks the attendant for a cheeseburger.
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reaches into his pocket for money, pays for the cheeseburger, sits down at a table, eats. etc. In 
short, he does nothing out of the ordinary. All of his actions fit neatly into our already existing 
McDonalds schema. His actions can be easily re-derived from the general McDonalds schema 
together with its variable bindings of "Green Street" and "cheeseburger" because all McDonalds are 
alike. There is no point in re-discovering a general version of the McDonalds schema from the 
low-level observed actions of John. That work would be wasted: we already have a general 
McDonalds schema. In general, for any subgoal in the explanation which is achieved by specifying 
a known schema and how that schema was instantiated in a nominal way. the actions making the 
nominal instantiation can be eliminated. The only structure that needs to be kept is the identity of 
the general schema and its variable bindings.
Step 4 further generalizes the explanation by eliminating all but the most abstract actions and 
states which support the achievement of the goal. This step eliminates abstraction inferences like 
the GUN = >  WEAPON inference which was eliminated from the SUICIDE example in section 8.3. 
It also provides an effective way of generalizing the actions in the explanation, like the TELE­
PHONE to COMMUNICATE generalization discussed earlier. Since TELEPHONE only supports the 
eventual goal through a BELIEF state which is inherited from the more abstract action COMMUNI­
CATE. the TELEPHONE may be eliminated from the explanation leaving only the more abstract 
action COMMUNICATE.
If the explanation is generated from observing external problem solving, step 5 is an attempt 
to improve the efficiency of a possibly sub-optimal plan. This is done by searching for subgoals 
which the system already has efficient schemata for achieving. If the system has a more efficient 
method for achieving a particular subgoal, it is substituted for the set of operators used by the 
observed agent. This allows for the substitution of a MOVETO for two TRANSLATES and a 
ROTATE in the robot assembly task discussed in section 5.2.
Step 6 sim ply  applies the GENERAL substitu tion  to the rem aining explanation stru ctu re  to 
give the final generalized explanation. The resulting generalized explanation can be easily  
tran sform ed  into a new schem a by identify ing its preconditions and effects. The preconditions of
the new schema, are those preconditions of the component schemata and operators which are not 
guaranteed to be satisfied internally. Some of its effects are simply the effects of the component 
schemata and operators not eliminated by a later component. However, some of the effects are spe­
cializations of the component s effects. These constraints are due to the required unifications with 
other components imposed by the causal structure of the solution.
9.2. The Kidnapping Example
As an example of the above procedure, consider the GENESIS natural language system (Moo­
ney & DeJong. 1985) acquiring a schema for kidnapping by generalizing the explanation of a kid­
napping narrative. The specification of the problem is given in Table 4. The schemata in the 
domain theory are defined by the set of lower-level schemata of which they are composed, and sets 
of preconditions, effects, and mental states which motivate the actor to perform the schema. The 
important goal achieved in the kidnapping narrative is John acquiring 250.000 dollars.
Figure 8 shows the causally complete structure the understanding process (step (1)) generates 
from the input text. The structure is instantiated to show the SPECIFIC interpretation. It shows
Table 4: SPECIFICATION OF THE KIDNAP GENERALIZATION PROBLEM
Given;
•  Domnin Theory: Schemata for actions like BARGAIN. DRIVE. THREATEN. TELEPHONE, etc.. 
Inference rules relating states like FATHER(x.v) — >  PARENT(x.y).
•  Goal: POSSESSUOHN. $250,000)
•  Initial State & Observed Operator Sequence: The Kidnap Story:
Fred is the father of Mary and is a millionaire. John approached Mary. She was wearing blue 
jeans. John pointed a gun at her and told her he wanted her to get into his car. He drove her to 
his hotel and locked her in his room. John called Fred and told him John was holding Mary 
captive. John told Fred if Fred gave him $ 250000 at Trenos then John would release Mary. 
Fred gave h.im the money and John released Mary.
Determine:
•  A general schema for kidnapping.
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how the low-level actions in the narrative can be interpreted as instances of general schemata the 
system already possesses, and how these schemata are causally connected to achieve the desired 
goal. As is evident from the figure, all the actions and states in the narrative support the achieve­
ment of the goal except the fact that Mary is wearing jeans. Consequently, only this fact is 
removed in step (2). The remaining structure is the explanation for how John acquired the money.
Step (3) eliminates nominal instantiations of schemata, or instantiations whose internal 
actions do not support the achievement of the ultimate goal except through the general goals 
achieved by the schema. This eliminates the specific actions John used to capture Mary and tele­
phone Fred as well as the specific actions involved in the bargain. The resulting explanation is 
shown in figure 9.
In step (4), actions and states which only support inferences to more abstract actions and 
states are retracted. This removes the state specifying that the ransom payer is the victim’s father, 
since this state is subsumed by the more abstract state specifying that the ransom payer and victim 
have a close interpersonal relationship. This close interpersonal relationship is the only require­
ment in motivating the ransom payer to fulfill his end of the bargain. It also removes the specific 
action TELEPHONE since this action is subsumed by the more abstract action COMMUNICATE.
POSSESS9 - 3ARGAIN1
*NS1 V  MTR/IA TR A /  ANS3 
RELEASE1
POSSESS 14 i POSSESS 1
G OAL—PRIORITY POSITIVE—IPT1
H ELD -CAPTIVE
P
P B E L I E F S C O M M U N I C A T E  1 TELEPHONE 1
ATTIRE1
PARENTI- • FATH ER 1
P A  D T I  I D E I  ^  P
BELIEF15- BELIEF16
m\ 8ELIEF13-*-------8ELIEF14
kG O A L -P R ;O R IT Y 4 -* -i- GOAL9 
i: inference; p: precondition; m: motivation; e: effect; c: composed-of
MTRANS2
DKNOW1
CPa TH I
THREATEN1 
c y v c
AIM1 MTRANS1
Figure 8! Complete Causal Structure of the Kidnapping N arrative.
Interpretation of nodes shown in Table 5.
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Table 5s Interpretation o f Nodes fo r Figures 8 & 9
POSSESS9 
BARGAIN 1
MTRANS3
RELEASE1
ATRANS1
POSSESS14
POSSESS1
GOAL-PRIORITY5
POSITIVE-IPT 1
PARENT 1
FATHER1
HELD-CAPTIVE 1
CAPTURE1
D-KNOW1
PTRANS1
DRIVE1
THREATEN1
AIM1
MTRANS1
ATI
CONFINE 1
FREE1
BELIEF8
COMMUNICATE 1 
TELEPHONE 1 
CALL1 
CPATH1 
MTRANS2 
BELIEF9 
BELIEF 15 
BELIEF 16 
BELIEF 13 
BELIEF14 
GOAL-PRIORITY4 
GOAL9
a t t ir e  i
John has $250,000.
John makes a bargain with Fred in which John releases Mary 
and Fred gives $250,000 to John.
John tells Fred he will release Mary if he gives him $250,000.
Fred releases Mary.
Fred gives John $250,000.
Fred has $250,000.
Fred has millions of dollars.
Fred wants Mary free more than he wants to have $250,000.
Fred has a positive interpersonal relationship with Mary.
Fred is Mary’s parent.
Fred is Mary’s father.
John is holding Mary captive.
John captures Mary.
John finds out where Mary is.
John moves Mary to his hotel room.
John drives Mary to his hotel room.
John threatens to shoot Mary unless she gets in his car.
John aims a gun at Mary
John tells Mary he wants her to get in his car.
Mary is in John’s hotel room.
John locks Mary in his hotel room.
Mary is free.
Fred believes John is holding Mary captive.
John contacts Fred and tells him that he is holding Mary captive.
John calls Fred and tells him that he is holding Marv captive.
John called Fred on the telephone.
John had a path of communication to Fred.
John told Fred he had Mary.
John believes he is holding Mary captive.
John believes Fred has $250,000.
John believes Fred has millions of dollars.
John believes Fred wants Mary to be free more than he wants to have $250,000. 
John believes Fred is Mary’s father.
John wants to have $250,000 more than he wants to hold Marv captive.
John wants to have $250,000.
Mary is wearing blue jeans.
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P0SSESS9- BARGAIN1
POSSESS 14 !■ POSSESS!
p/ g o a l - p r io r i t y 5- 
C h e l d - c a p t iv e i  -4-
P
•POSITIVE—IPT1-
___ _______  e
PARENTI - FATHER1 
CAPTURE! FREE!
BELIEF8- COMMUNICATE T
„  BELIEF9 
TELEPHONE!
sP BELIEF 15 BEUEF16
mX 'BELIEF13 BELIEF14
GOAL—PRIOR ITY4> 
i: inference; p: precondition; m: motivation; e: effect
GOAL9
Figure 9: Explanation o f Kidnapping a fte r Step 3.
Interpretation of nodes shown in Table 5.
The COMMUNICATE is the on ly  requirem ent in transferring  the appropriate inform ation to the 
ransom  payer which a llow s him to participate in the bargain.
Since the system  does not have a m ore efficient m ethod fo r  achieving any o f the subgoals in 
the plan , no optim ization is done in step  (5 ) . F in a lly , apply ing the GENERAL substitu tion  to the 
rem aining stru cture  in step (6 )  resu lts  in the final generalized explanation show n in figure 10.
Figure 10: F inal Generalized Explanation o f Kidnapping
Interpretation of nodes shown in Table 6.
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Table 6: Interpretation o f nodes fo r Figure 10.
POSSESS9
BARGAIN1
POSSESS14
GOAL-PRIORITY5
POSITIVE-IPT1
HELD-CAPTIVE 1
CAPTURE 1
FREE1
BELIEF8
COMMUNICATE1 
BELIEF9 
BELIEF 15 
BELIEF 13
BELIEF14
GOAL-PRIORITY4
GOAL9
Person 1 has Money 1.
Person 1 makes a bargain with Person2 in which Person 1 releases Person3 
and Person2 gives Money 1 to Person 1.
Person2 has Money 1.
Person2 wants Person3 free more than he wants to have Money 1.
There is a positive interpersonal relationship between Person2 and Person3. 
Person 1 is holding Person3 captive.
Person 1 captures Person3.
Person3 is free.
Person2 believes Person 1 is holding Person3 captive.
Person 1 contacts Person2 and tells him that he is holding Person3 captive. 
Person 1 believes he is holding Person3 captive.
Person 1 believes Person2 has Money 1.
Person 1 believes Person2 wants Person3 to be free more than he wants 
to have Money 1.
Person 1 believes there is a positive interpersonal relationship between 
Person2 and Person3.
Person 1 wants to have Money 1 more than he wants to hold Person3 captive. 
Person 1 wants to have Money 1.
The generalized explanation is easily packaged into a schema by taking its leaves to be precon­
ditions and the combined effects of its actions to be effects. This schema can then be stored away 
and used in understanding future narratives.
10. Conclusions
In this paper our approach to learning has been contrasted at some length with the approach 
of Mitchell. Keller, and Kedar-Cabelli (1986). One might forget that in the universe of learning 
research our approaches are very similar. Far more views and biases unite us than divide us. 
Indeed, this is true across most explanation-based learning efforts. Let us contrast the 
explanation-based approach with generalization learning in a few non-explanation-based systems.
In the ACT system (Anderson, 1983), processing is done in a production system framework. 
The production rules formulate solutions to problems given to the system. Generalized rules are 
formed to capture the generalities among two examples. Each example consists of a problem and 
its solution. The generalization captures what the two examples have in common. The
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generalization process does not itself interact with any domain knowledge. It is performed bv a 
partial pattern matcher, incidentally the same partial pattern matcher that underlies analogical 
learning. It can be contrasted to the explanation based approach in two ways: 1) there is no domain 
theory that participates in the generalization process. 2) the generalization algorithm is not well 
defined with just one example.
The SOAR system (Laird et al., 1984), shares the notion of knowledge chunking with our 
work and indeed with much of the other explanation-based work. Their claim is that chunking of 
knowledge (in the form of production rules) is universal for learning. That is. no other learning 
mechanisms need be postulated. In particular there is no domain theory needed to guide the gen­
eralization process. This, again, differs from the explanation-based learning work. 'Furthermore, 
no researcher in explanation-based learning has yet made a claim of universality for the approach; 
most researchers seem to believe that the ultimate answer to learning will involve a combination of 
explanation-based, similarity based and analogical algorithms.
EL RISKO (Lenat & Brown. 1984) is in some sense the dual to explanation-based systems. 
Both are knowledge based and require some form of domain theory to be input. However. 
ELR1SKO attempts to discover heuristic concepts. Heuristics are rules of thumb that seem to hold 
in the domain but for which there is no explanatory analysis. EURISKO tries to discover helpful 
concepts through massive simulation. An explanation-based system, on the other hand, generates a 
concept only if it can analyze why it works.
The explanation-based approach to learning holds great promise, particularly in the area of 
learning apprentice systems (Minton. 1985; Mitchell et al., 1985: O’Rorke. 1984; Wilkins et al.. 
1985) and other systems that can learn from observing behavior beyond their capabilities (Ellman. 
1985: Minton. 1984: Mooney & DeJong. 1985: Segre & DeJong, 1985; Shavlik. 1985). However, 
recent research in explanation-based learning has only scratched the surface.
To date, working explanation-based systems have learned by explaining new configurations of 
known operators. We call this schema composition. There are many other uses of explanations to 
drive both generalization and concept refinement (DeJong. 1983).
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Another important area for future research is combining similarity based and explanation- 
based methods. There has already been significant research on combining the two approaches along 
many different directions (Lebowitz. 1985; Mitchell. 1984: Pazzani, 1985; Porter & Kibler. 1985: 
Rajamoney et al.. 1985)
Finally, we wish to stress the important part that implementation of large computer systems 
played in our work. Time and again algorithms that appeared elegant on paper could not be imple­
mented. Even more important were the gaps in our theories that attempts at implementation 
exposed. Theories that appeared to be general and worked well in several domains failed to sup­
port an apparently similar type of concept acquisition when extended to yet another domain. We 
believe that significant implementations in many diverse domains, although often painful and in
many ways expensive, is a necessary step toward a formalized general theory of explanation-based 
learning. -
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